Of Diebuster, structure, and the parents of gods

By Pontifus on 4 June 2009 | Anime, Literature | 14 Comments

Breaking into the super robot genre has proven difficult for me, so I asked the wise OGT to point me toward a few shows that might help. Among other things, he recommended Gunbuster (aka Top wo Nerae!) — you may already know this, given all the fanboying I did over the show and its sequel. Gunbuster was probably just the sort of thing I needed, tempered as it is by enough drama and pain to sustain my interest through the genuinely awesome moments, which I can in fact enjoy on the level of genuine awesome if I stay interested long enough.

Diebuster, though.

You want to put it into words. You really try. But the last episode explodes your mind, and you’re left with assorted pieces, slightly charred, floating through space. You could leave it at that, but these pieces practically beg to be reassembled, and I’m nothing if not tenacious when it comes to weaving my webs.

So this is a post about Diebuster, ostensibly. But where to begin? “At the beginning,” some would no doubt suggest, but that’s part of the problem: the story’s structure resists that sensible impulse. It’s vexing now that I’m trying to put my thoughts in order, but it’s not something a first-time viewer would notice early on — the beginning seems just fine, and it is, in more ways than are evident from the beginning.

If that makes little sense, you can blame Diebuster’s unusual structure. Things we see in the beginning are parts of larger things that aren’t evident until later; crucially relevant information is withheld. Open an image in your favorite image editor, zoom in as far as you can, and then zoom out slowly, and you’ll get the idea. We could call it “revelation,” but it’s more ubiquitous than a series of run-of-the-mill reveals — plot, characters, setting, et al. (or, specifically, our perception of them, which is what matters anyway) are affected across the board, enmeshed as they are in a structure that’s heavily reliant on strategic obscurity and the unexpected.

It’s atypical, perhaps, but not unique, or even especially new; eighty or so years earlier, the same technique saw use by (you guessed it) James Joyce, particularly in Ulysses1. Joyce scholar Fritz Senn calls it “circumdation:”

In [Ulysses's] first chapter we will figure out, not in the conventional, expositional order, but by circumstantial links, the setting on top of a historical tower, somewhere near Dublin, at a certain time. The last two chapters, “Ithaca” and “Penelope,” above all put much of what we had taken for granted into a different light. Adjustment takes patience and circumspection, many retracings in an Odyssean progression of trial and error… As often as not we may still be waiting for the final, redeeming “circumdet” that makes everything fall into line.2

It must be said that Diebuster is more comprehensible the first time through than Ulysses. Still, if you compared the point-by-point, beginning-to-end analyses of a first-time viewer and a second-time viewer, you may not find much middle ground. I’ve watched bits and pieces of earlier episodes after finishing the show, and the experience was quite different the second time around, relatively speaking; given how much we learn about Nono, the Topless, the space monsters, and the universe itself along the way, and how much of that information is the sort that’s probably evident to the characters all along even if we aren’t aware of it, the second viewing produces constructs of meaning vastly different from the first. Many stories (maybe all stories) have this quality to some degree, but Diebuster has it in spades — again, it shapes the story’s very momentum.

Since I’ve ended up on the topic of second viewing anyway, consider the first episode on rewatch. We know of Nono’s identity; much of what she does makes a new sort of sense, or assumes altered significance. We know that Lal’c, with all of her baggage (of which we also know), is responsible for the brief voice-over during the opening moments, and we’ve heard the complementary voice-over in episode 6. We know the basis of Tycho’s attitude toward Lal’c. We know more about the antagonists, about the setting, about practically everything. It seems, to me at least, a more profound change in experience than that brought about by simply knowing what will happen in future episodes.

With that said, circumdation isn’t specifically a process that takes place between viewings; it happens all along, and forces us to question our assumptions even during the first viewing. We’re kept on our toes, made to disassemble initial conclusions, insert new information, and reconstruct them as best we can, all while processing plot developments which, in six episodes, don’t have time to pause and give us a breather. It results in a very active, almost hectic reading process — I enjoy it, usually, though I wonder if this would be a basis of complaint for some viewers.

The effect is most evident in later episodes, when revelatory events invoke broad re-imaginings — episode four in particular comes to mind, and the sixth episode affirms that Diebuster’s circumdative nature can reach even Gunbuster, if we let it. Being a matter of basic structure, however, it’s present all along. In the first episode, for example, we aren’t even certain of the setting (that is, Mars) until the latter third or so, when it’s announced outright. Consider the screencaps above, both from the beginning; the predominance of blue, the snow, and the rustic nature of the houses are all deceptive. As the episode progresses, yellow and red come to dominate the palette, technology becomes more evident, and we might, if we’re perceptive, “figure out” (as Senn says) “not in the conventional, expositional order, but by circumstantial links, the setting.” Appropriately enough, the reveal itself takes the form of a literal zoom-out.

Now, I do enjoy examining structure, probably more than I enjoy examining socio-culturo-historico-things in the usual way. But structural nuances, I must admit after a thousand-odd words about them, are not much of a starting point, which is to say that my thoughts on a story don’t begin with the specifics of its twists and turns. Customarily, I’ll try to attach broad identifiers to a thing, but Diebuster even makes that difficult — about which I am thrilled, as any excuse to combine Northrop Frye and mad speculation is a good one.

Diebuster is a mecha show, certainly. It might be postmodern, though I suspect it takes that half-step beyond that hints at postmodernism’s relevance having begun its slow death. Terms like “mecha” and “postmodern,” however, are narrower than the identifiers I have in mind — namely, Frye’s modes and mythoi. It’s possible that these terms are too restrictively Aristotelian; it’s also possible that, when these terms no longer serve our needs as-is (which isn’t necessarily the case, mind you), it’s time to play around with them, and you should know by now that nothing is sacred when I wield my Unlimited Interpretation Works.

We can say one thing with some certainty: Diebuster has irony. I don’t claim that it falls within the range of Frye’s ironic mode (I would’ve said it is ironic); it may, but I’m not yet certain of that. I simply mean that Diebuster is bursting with ironic elements, things that aren’t what they seem they normally would or should be and situations that play out in unexpected ways. Given circumdation, the very structure itself is ironic; one might say irony is its gimmick. And the characters — really, if you’ve seen Diebuster, I doubt I need to explain how the Topless are atypical super robot pilots. Consider Casio, who, despite his hanging around and offering words of wisdom where needed, essentially quit the mecha business out of fear, or Nicola, who, lacking any direction of his own, just rolls with whatever life throws at him. Tycho and Lal’c aren’t what you’d call paragons of awesome, either, until Nono teaches them how to be. And if you figured out what Nono is before the reveal in episode four, you’re probably superhuman, as it’s really just ridiculous (in a good way).

It’s possible, if we’re going with a descriptor that consists of mode and mythos (and we are, because I like to), that Diebuster is “ironic irony,” that it meets the conditions of the ironic mode (the work deals with characters presented as “below” the reader in situation or surroundings) and the ironic branch of the Mythos of Winter (the work applies myth conventions and storytelling methods new and old to realistic, recognizable situations). The latter is likely accurate; despite their capabilities and their surroundings, the Topless are all too human in their mannerisms and conflicts (perhaps it’s the effect of realism on familiar tropes that gives irony its unpredictable nature to begin with). But are they ironic characters in the modal sense? They do, after all, still have those capabilities, and they still inhabit those surroundings; the basic conditions under which their humanity takes place are unfamiliar to us. Consider the climax, during which, for a brief period, the laws of the physical universe don’t apply to Nono at all. Mode-wise, it’s almost mythological.

That in itself isn’t mind-blowing. I’ll borrow Cuchlann’s lovingly hand-crafted illustration:

It’s reasonable to imagine the modes as a cycle, and even Frye speculated in the Anatomy of Criticism that the literature of his time showed signs of moving away from irony and toward myth and romance, citing science fiction specifically. We could stick Diebuster somewhere between irony and myth, and label it transitional, and I’d be okay with that. But something deep in the untamed wilds of my mind insists that there must be more to it than that, that I shouldn’t be so quick to concede to Frye’s cycle as is. It almost feels as though we’re missing something.

Consider the relationship between contemporary “myth” and what we usually think of as myth, stories of gods and heroes and such. Both are basically myth, in Fryean terms, as both involve characters who surpass human beings in kind; whether we’re talking about Zeus or Buster Machine No. 7, we’re dealing with characters whose means fall beyond the comprehension of the humans below them. Those humans may possess the fantastical powers of the romantic mode, but they’re still human, literally speaking, and their abilities, however potent, cannot match those of the myth-figures present.

There is, however, one key difference between mythic paragons old and new. The former are made by older deities, generally, elsewise they simply are. In the beginning, there was Oceanus and Tethys, or Chronos, or Chaos, or Muspell and its guardian Surt, or God who created the heavens and the earth; these deities oversee the creation of other deities (when they allow other deities to exist), the processes of which don’t involve human beings much at all. But consider our alleged contemporary mythology. Nono is a war machine built by humans, one imbued with human-like intelligence and emotion. The Tengen Toppa Gurren Lagann is raw human potential made manifest. In Dan Simmons’s Hyperion Cantos, those we see gain power over time and space are either human or human-made. In Stranger in a Strange Land, Valentine Michael Smith leverages Martian wisdom with his humanity to reach his state of godliness. The difference, then: we, humans, make the gods — sometimes we are the gods. I don’t believe that’s something we can ignore.

We might call this strategic use of the unexpected, irony in the vein of this ironic age. Or we might not; I’m not sure that it’s expected or unexpected, if that makes any sense. It’s simply a fictional truth that continues to appear in the fiction (especially the science fiction) I consume. It’s not even especially surprising; irony has primed me and others to accept that God is dead, disinterested, or irrelevant, that there is no concrete meaning of life, and that, subsequently, we’re free to fill the meaning-void with whatever meaning we choose, as soon as we stop moping about there being no meaning in the first place (did I mention I usually don’t like postmodernism?). We are creators, in that sense; Heinlein’s aforementioned Stranger in a Strange Land presents that idea with little distillation. It’s as if we’ve been getting it wrong all along — rather than products of gods, we are fledgling gods ourselves. Thou art God, as it were. Please continue being a Messiah.

I’m not claiming that’s a fact of the natural universe, or even that the idea’s increasing presence in narrative art is evidence of some deep awareness of the idea on our collective part (realistically I might suggest the latter, but that’d make this post much longer than it is already, and I don’t want that). I am claiming that what Frye had in mind when he outlined the mythic mode…

If superior in kind both to other men and to the environment of other men, the hero is a divine being, and the story about him will be a myth in the common sense of a story about a god. Such stories have an important place in literature, but are as a rule found outside the normal literary categories.3

…may not describe satisfyingly or with suitable accuracy our new mythology, which, given that, may not be mythology at all. It is at the very least a mythology informed by our having written our way through the entirety of Frye’s cycle and emerged from irony intact, one which acknowledges that, even when gods grow beyond our ability to control, they wouldn’t exist at all if not for us — even from works in which gods exist literally, such as Neil Gaiman’s American Gods, Terry Pratchett’s Small Gods, and (since this is basically an anime blog, after all) Kannagi, we often get the sense that a god’s power depends in whole or large part on the devotion of its followers. Either we are gods, or we inflict them upon the universe — the two may be basically the same thing. Perhaps, if we’re going to keep the cycle of modes, we should accommodate expansion, turn it into a spiral whose size reflects the experience we accumulate as we travel the modes.

Or perhaps we must acknowledge that the cycle is a result of our oversimplification of an amalgam of modes with no clear demarcations between them. “Fictions,” says Frye, “may be classified…by the hero’s power of action, which may be greater than ours, less, or roughly the same4” — but what if, in fiction, our power of action knows no bounds, or if an apparently mythic hero’s power of action is no more or less than what we “mere” humans decide it is? Perhaps we haven’t come full circle, so to speak, but have integrated all modes known thus far into our understanding, in a linear progression — and if that’s the case, what undiscovered modes lie ahead? What happens when self-aware gods write stories about themselves?


Endnotes

1Not that Joyce invented it singlehandedly, but, to my knowledge, he refined it into something like what we experience in Diebuster. Even very old literature relies on the withholding of information from the audience, but, in this case (and in the case of Ulysses), it’s synonymous with the narrative structure itself, which offers understanding slowly as a series of junctures which broaden setting and characters in steps.

2Senn, Fritz. “Anagnostic Probes.” Joyce, Modernity, and Its Mediation. Ed. Christine van Boheemen. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989: 40, 44.

3Frye, Northrop. Anatomy of Criticism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000: 33.

4Ibid.

14 Responses to “Of Diebuster, structure, and the parents of gods”

  1. A whole lot to think on here.

    The withholding of information, and subsequent selectiveness of the reveal is pretty much for me makes narratives turn into literature; and by that I mean that it is a product of craft. This circumdation, and it being the narrative structure itself, is very crafty. Good job of highlighting this.

    And btw, that spiral energy meter as the cuchlannic myth continuum is the best image used in a blog post I’ve seen ever.

    This post rocks so hard.

    • Pontifus says:

      As soon as I thought about all this in relation to spiral energy, I knew that graphic had to be done.

      I’m fairly interested in different kinds of information-giving (or information-withholding) approaches. I’d agree that it’s an important part of what makes literature work the way it does. Tomino could’ve never gotten away with the structure of Overman King Gainer (which doesn’t withhold information strategically so much as just not give much of it) if it were a biography — that’s probably why I don’t read many biographies, actually. Now that I think about it, selective withholding may be even more integral to science fiction than other types, given the way it works as far as world-building during reading, which is something Cuchlann could explain much better than I could; circumdation may feel more “natural” in something like Diebuster for that reason.

  2. vendredi says:

    That difference you articulate between “old” and “new” mythologies just blew my mind – I think you’re really on to something there. Haven’t read the Hyperion Cantos, but I have read Simmons’ other duology, Ilium/Olympos – and the idea of gods being realized through technology is still very much present. You can see a sort of parallel track happening with certain genres, such as how mythic tropes are increasingly satirized or incorporated into pop culture, making gods more human, as it were?

    Perhaps Jung’s theory of mythological archetypes is relevant here too – the idea that mythological characters, gods, etc. all are a manifestation of various archetypes that mirror universal human experiences; it seems to be an example that resonates very well with this new mythology. Heck, there’s even a game for it – the Persona series.

    • Cuchlann says:

      For Jung’s theory applied directly to myth and literature, see Joseph Campbell. : )

    • Pontifus says:

      Hell yeah Persona. Also re: Cuchlann, hell yeah Joseph Campbell. Honestly I don’t know much Jung at all, and I think it would help.

      I wonder if we should differentiate between literature in which humans achieve godlike proportions, and literature in which their creations do the same. The latter situation makes us sort-of gods, I guess — ancient gods were always taking power from their forebears, so it may not matter that we’re less obviously potent — but maybe there’s something to be gained from speculating on whether humans are ultimately Olympian or primordial.

  3. animekritik says:

    I think the differences or development of the gods goes along with the development of human understanding too. Back 3 or 4,000 years ago to be able to control lightning would have been the coolest thing ever (thus Indra, Thor, Zeus). Later on, we improve our technology and start seeding clouds for rain, that superpower’s not godly enough. Now we need time and space controlling entities like Haruhi!!

    • Pontifus says:

      Somehow I didn’t think to mention Haruhi. Have I blasphemed?

      Yeah, I’ve considered that part of it is a matter of spectacle in literature changing with the times. It’s hard to be impressed even by a rocket traveling to the moon anymore; we need ships and people who can step into and out of physical space, and so on. But it almost feels as if the foresight from which we pull impressive science-fictional things knows no bounds; we’re confident in our ability to do just about anything, eventually. Maybe it’s a result of the last hundred years’ rate of technological and scientific development, whether godly awareness or overconfidence. I’m not suggesting that the point of science fiction is the suggesting of things that may actually happen; it’s just interesting that, when writers could turn to literal gods or at least similarly powerful entities to fulfill their spectacular needs, they choose humans and human-made things instead.

  4. Cuchlann says:

    Woo!

    Thought: it’s actually possible that a new literary construction may allow for narrative outside Frye’s system. That is, the SF conception of humankind as creator of something that could be likened (at least) to life itself. Go Frankenstein (and/or golem stories, you know, whatever)! The humans are mimetic/romantic (depending on how you view their ability to do science), the creations are romantic or, in this case and others, god-like (Mazinger = Zeus?), and the parts are integrated using the irony you’ve identified.

    I guess the question is whether these creations are really gods. Does Nono ever do anything she wasn’t originally designed for? I’ll have to re-watch soon and see.

    Oh, also, see Stanislaw Lem’s book, The Cyberiad, about a universe populated by robots (who, it’s hinted, were made by organic lifeforms at some point, but they’re all dead); the stories center around two constructors — two robots who are robot engineers, effectively celebrated (rather than despised) Victor Frankensteins.

    The difference between constructed lives as either romantic or mythic, is Nietzsche (of course!). Robots without the will-to-power are just like Asimov’s robots: awesome but dawdling. With it? Nono.

    • Pontifus says:

      So it’s sort of about self-determination/will to power, you say? Actually, let me take a step back and suggest that perhaps gods, in the traditional sense, are just obsolete entirely. If (in the fiction in question, anyway) science makes a practically limitless number of things possible for anyone with reasonable access to it, and thus many humans can do things once attributed to deities, perhaps the dividing line between gods and men has simply corroded. Or maybe science is the god. I figure powerful humans are in most cases necessarily romantic by virtue of being human, but I can think of a few cases in which human characters with godlike powers seemed different enough from humanity as we know it to qualify as mythic, possibly.

      I did read Frankenstein, but that’s about the extent of my knowledge of early literature with those kinds of creator characters. Just a thought…is there any criticism out there that judges Dr. Frankenstein by way of the monster’s attributes, or advocates such an approach? I feel like it’d be useful to figure out how much the creation is or can be an extension of the creator.

      • IKnight says:

        A lot of people refer to the Creature as ‘Frankenstein’, which isn’t so much a an extension as it is a consumption. But maybe that can be discounted as superficial, and an accident of history.

        • Cuchlann says:

          I think most of the time the creature’s attributes are considered part of its rearing (really, the lack thereof). Most modern readings don’t do much with the “nature” side of the “nature/nurture” debate, choosing to see the creature as something with potential that was abandoned by its creator. It’s probably out there, though. I might see it soon — I’m hoping to teach lit. next semester, and Frankenstein is on my list of novels to teach (along with Cat’s Cradle, the Odyssey, Beowulf, and, uh, some other stuff I’ll figure out eventually).

          • Pontifus says:

            I remember (maybe incorrectly, I was 17 when I read it) that the novel itself is pretty overt about the nurture side of things being more to blame. Frankenstein could be a bad example. I suppose I’m thinking more of situations in which the creator has a more active role in the nurturing — the programming/training of AI, for example.

  5. [...] Pontifus’s post on Diebuster and ironimythical theory [->] often has nothing whatsoever to do with Diebuster in specific but that doesn’t mean it [...]

  6. [...] while ago, OGT recommended Gunbuster and its sequel to me as gateway shows into the super robot genre. I still have yet to really delve into the genre, [...]

Leave a Reply